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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S recession of 2007 to 2009 is unique in the post-World-War-II experience by the broad 
company it kept.  Activity contracted around the world, with the advanced countries of the North 
experiencing declines in spending normally the purview of the developing economies of the 
South.  The last time that the economies of the North similarly headed south was the 1930s.  This 
paper examines the role of policy in fostering recovery in that decade.   With nominal short-term 
interest rates already near zero, monetary policy in most countries took the unconventional step 
of delinking currencies from the gold standard. However, analysis of a sample that includes 
developing countries shows that this was not as universally effective as often claimed, perhaps 
because the exit from gold was uncoordinated in time, scale, and scope and, in many countries, 
failed to bring about a substantial depreciation against the dollar. Fiscal policy was also active in 
the 1930s—many countries sharply increased government spending—but prone to reversals that 
may have undermined confidence. Countries that were more consistent in keeping spending high 
tended to recover more quickly. 
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I. Introduction 
The financial and economic dislocations of the past two years have been sharp and 
widespread. Yet there is ample precedent for such crises—and for the economic adjustment that 
follows to be wrenching. Among the advanced economies, those earlier crises occurred either 
before World War II or in open economies that were out of sync with the global cycle. 1 Crashes 
and severe contractions have been more common in emerging market economies. In the current 
episode, however, activity collapsed in unison in developed and developing countries around the 
world. Indeed, the rarity of current circumstances is why we rely on an event three-quarters of a 
century old, the Great Depression, as the main comparator.2  
Given the importance of that precedent in understanding the current contraction, it is 
useful to cast a sharp focus on the role that policy actions played in shaping recovery in the 
1930s. Unconventional monetary policy action has been called (Svensson 2003) a “foolproof 
way” of preventing deflation in especially an open economy that can generate additional demand 
through depreciation of its currency. But when the global pie is shrinking, such action may be 
less effective. In the 1930s, moving off the gold standard bought fiscal authorities in many 
countries more space for stimulus because their central banks had room on their balance sheets to 
purchase more government securities and to generate additional income.  It also allowed each 
country to devalue relative to gold.3 Those actions, however, were mostly uncoordinated in time, 
scale, and scope. As a consequence, the record of success among countries abandoning the gold 
standard, both in avoiding a severe contraction and in speeding the recovery, is quite mixed.  It 
                                                 
1
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide many comparisons and a full explanation of the data. 
2
 Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) provide useful comparisons to that episode as well. 
3
 This strategy is discussed in Eichengreen (1992) and Romer (1992). 
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should be no surprise that the benefits of competitive devaluations (or less charitably “beggar-
thy-neighbor” policies, as described by Nurkse, 1944) went to the first movers—for those that 
followed this path later, it merely allowed for “catch-up” for lost competitiveness. 
The 1930s also saw massive increases in government spending in many countries, but 
fiscal authorities were prone to reverse themselves. As a result, some of the direct benefits of that 
spending were offset by harmful effects stemming from its volatility.  
 
II. The Appropriate Precedent 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research has 
put the peak of the current U.S. cycle at the end of 2007. There is no such equivalent formalism 
at the world level, but indicators for most other countries started turning down about six months 
later, consistent with the view that the United States led the way down. Robert Barro and José 
Ursúa (2008) have demonstrated that occasional large, adverse shocks hit national economies 
without the reason for those shocks always being clear. The current episode is particularly 
unusual because so many economies around the world contracted simultaneously.  
Table 1 provides a historical perspective on the rarity of events like those of recent years, 
by documenting changes in real exports during past systemic crises from 1890 to today, for 
samples ranging 35 to 111 countries. The episodes included in the table are those that saw spikes 
in the number of banking crises worldwide, as reported by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 
(2009). As is evident from the table, it is not unprecedented for a majority of countries to 
experience declines in real exports coincident with systemic financial crises. Many of the median 
changes listed in the last column are negative, and the largest declines (which the preceding 
column reports for each country) are quite large indeed. The scale of the most recent experience, 
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however, has only one precedent, namely, the early 1930s: more than four-fifths of countries in 
both periods saw contractions in exports of greater than 15 percent. The scope of the problem 
also distinguishes the Great Depression and the current, second “Great Contraction”: only in 
those two episodes did virtually all of the nations of the world witness shrinking trade flows. No 
other crisis period in the past century matches that experience. 
This commonality of the experience in these two episodes makes an examination of the 
setting of policy in the 1930s relevant for consideration today. We will deal with the actions of 
the monetary and fiscal authorities in turn. 
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Table 1. Declines in Real Exports during Crisis Episodes  
   Countries experiencing 
real export decline 
(percent of total) 
  
 
 
Episode 
 
 
Year 
 
No. of 
countries 
 
 
Any 
Greater 
than 15 
percent 
Largest 
decline 
(percent) 
Median 
change 
(percent) 
Barings crisis 1890 35 34.3 5.2 -18.0 2.2 
 1891 35 57.1 8.6 -47.5 -1.0 
Panic of 1907 1907 73 31.5 4.1 -27.4 6.9 
 1908 75 66.7 20.0 -33.6 -5.4 
Commodity crash 1920 70 48.6 31.4 -60.9 1.4 
 1921 73 76.7 54.8 -73.7 -19.8 
Great Depression 1929 94 43.6 13.8 -36.2 1.3 
 1930 94 88.3 48.9 -51.2 -13.9 
 
1931 95 100 88.4 -73.5 -33.3 
 1932 95 80.0 62.1 -53.8 -17.1 
Sterling crisis 1967 104 48.5 23.3 -92.0 0.4 
End of Bretton Woods 1973 111 11.7 4.5 -79.4 39.1 
First oil shock 1975 110 41.8 29.1 -78.3 1.8 
Latin American debt crisis 1981 106 60.4 31.1 -70.7 -3.6 
 1982 108 62.3 29.2 -77.2 -4.0 
Nordic crises 1991 93 57.0 26.9 -75.8 -1.4 
Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis 1992 95 36.8 14.7 -65.6 3.9 
Tequila crisis 1995 105 23.8 11.4 -79.3 9.4 
1997 109 40.4 13.8 -83.8 2.8 Asia, Russia, LTCM crises 
1998 107 51.4 22.4 -62.4 -1.4 
September 11 2001 108 74.1 28.7 -39.8 -9.6 
“Great Contraction” 2008 87 86.2 52.9 -74.1 -16.6 
 2009a 42 100.0 92.9 -62.2 -36.6 
       
Averages 1890-1939 70 41.1 18.0 -82.2 4.5 
 1957-2008 99 33.0 14.6 -92.0 9.2 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, appendix A); League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; national 
sources; Maddison (2004); Mitchell (2003 a, b, and c).    
a. Through April. 
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II. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy during the Great Depression 
The wrenching adjustment in activity around the world strained the confidence of many 
public officials in the speed and extent to which the market system would correct.  As a 
consequence, the range of policy response was wide.  The major form monetary policy 
experimentation took was to expand central bank balance sheets by lowering the gold content of 
the home currency.  As will be discussed below, countries devalued relative to gold at different 
points over the decade and by different amounts.  The mechanism through which this was 
expansionary can best be understood by considering a single country’s experience.   
In the United States, the key decision in the early 1930s that shifted the stance of 
monetary policy decisively toward ease was not made by the nation’s principal monetary 
authority, the Federal Reserve. Rather, it was the devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold by 
newly inaugurated President Franklin Roosevelt in April 1933, followed by a sharp increase in 
gold inflows as a result of political instability in Europe, that produced a marked relaxation of 
monetary conditions, through a large increase in high-powered money. 4 5 As shown in figure 1, 
high-powered money in the United States (essentially, currency in circulation, vault cash, and 
banks’ deposits with the Federal Reserve) increased by 60 percent from March 1933 to May 
1937 (the trough and peak, respectively, of the business cycle); the M1 measure of the money 
supply expanded by about the same amount from 1933 to 1937. Short-term nominal interest 
rates, proxied in the bottom panel by the three-month Treasury bill rate, were already close to 
                                                 
4
 There were two steps in the process.  Executive Order 6102 in April 1933 lowered the gold-content of the dollar 
and prohibited the public from holding gold.  The value of the dollar vis-à-vis gold was subsequently lowered again 
with the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. 
5
 Eichengreen (1992), Romer (1992), and Bernanke (2004) explain the mechanics. Important earlier contributions 
include Choudhri and Kochin (1980) and Hamilton (1988).  
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zero. Thus, in the decade from 1932 onward, policy impetus cannot be measured by reference 
only to the level of the short-term interest rate.  
 
 8 
Then as now, the size and the composition of the monetary authority’s balance sheet had 
the potential to influence financial markets and the economy. An enlarged balance sheet also 
provided fiscal authorities more space to be aggressive, if they felt so inclined.6 All this meets 
the definition of “unconventional” monetary policy and quantitative easing (as in Bernanke and 
Reinhart 2004). In the standard rendering, there were three acts to this episode of quantitative 
easing.  
In the first act, in 1932, U.S. policymakers extended their mistake of the prior three years 
of not addressing a crisis of confidence.  After the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the public sought 
to build up a cushion of safe assets.   For households, this meant holding more currency.  For 
banks, the demand for reserves rose.  Declines in asset values and increased liquidity demand 
strained the financial system, leading to a daisy chain of bank failures.  But these bank failures 
further heightened demands for safe assets. 7. High-powered money did expand, but by too little 
to offset increases in desired currency and reserve holdings, as detailed by Milton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz (1963) and by Philip Cagan (1965).8 Next, President Roosevelt’s decision to 
devalue relative to gold in 1933 triggered an expansion in the monetary authority’s balance sheet 
                                                 
6
 Open market purchases of Treasury securities can lower yields on government debt if assets are imperfect 
substitutes for each other. Even if they are perfect substitutes, the swap of interest-bearing government debt for non-
interest-bearing reserves works to lower debt service. Also, a decline in real interest rates improves measures of debt 
sustainability. Two issues arise, however. First, the macroeconomic effects will depend on whether the public 
capitalizes the income stream of central bank profits. Second, paying interest on reserves lessens the reduction in the 
debt burden associated with open market purchases. 
7
 Harold James (2009) argues that these two episodes are distinct.  The year 1929 marked a major asset revaluation 
and 1931 was a year of banking collapse.  Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) approach to dating banking crises would 
arguethat the fall of 1929 marked the beginning of the banking crisis and 1932 its peak. 
 
8
 This failure can be explained as the Federal Reserve being either hamstrung by the gold standard (as argued in 
Eichengreen 1992) or focused too much on reserve supply rather than reserve demand (as in Meltzer 2003). Either 
case amounts to a lack of willingness to use the appropriate policy tools, not lack of ability. Hsieh and Romer (2006) 
show that a short-lived monetary accommodation in 1932 did not trigger concerns in markets or among 
policymakers about a destabilizing exit from the gold standard. 
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and sent a clear signal of the intent to reflate.9 In the final act, policymakers repeated their initial 
mistake and contracted policy by sterilizing gold inflows in 1936 and increasing reserve 
requirements in 1937, stalling the expansion of high-powered money.10 This third act highlights 
the danger of a premature exit from policy accommodation, as Christina Romer has recently 
pointed out.11 It is the middle act, the move off the gold standard, that has been most widely 
praised and that offers the best evidence that unconventional policy action can spur recovery. But 
although the U.S. experience can be interpreted that way, the wider international record is more 
mixed.  
Devaluing a nation’s currency in terms of gold has three distinct effects.12 First, the 
home-currency value of the monetary authority’s resources expands. If, as in the U.S. case in 
1933, short-term interest rates are near the zero bound, this amounts to unconventional 
monetary policy. Second, if other countries remain at an unchanged gold parity (or devalue by 
less than the home country), the exports of the home country become priced more competitively 
on world markets. Third, devaluation might be interpreted as a regime switch, signaling higher 
inflation in the future and therefore working to lower real interest rates immediately. 
Table 2 gives a year-by-year chronology of countries’ exits from the gold standard 
during the 1930s, along with some information about the course of economic contraction and 
recovery in each country. The first column reports the year that output peaked—usually 1928 or 
1929. The second column reports the peak-to-trough decline in real output. This was, indeed, a 
                                                 
9
 Romer (1992) stresses the multiplier effects of the former; Eichengreen and Temin (2000) emphasize the change in 
the zeitgeist as rekindling inflation expectations.  
10
 Meltzer (2003) and Orphanides (2004) review this experience. 
11
 Christina D. Romer, “The Lessons of 1937,” The Economist, June 18, 2009. 
12
 Eichengreen and Sachs (1986) work through the effects in a simple model. 
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wrenching contraction, with the 29 percent decline in the United States on the high side of 
experience. Small open economies that were reliant on commodity production, such as Chile, 
Nicaragua, and Uruguay, were hit especially hard. Closed economies, such as Italy and 
Portugal, in contrast, fared better.  
The last column in the table provides a metric for recovery: the number of years it took 
for output to return to the previous peak. This seems an intuitive way to measure a downturn, 
but it is also quite conservative. Ongoing expansion in potential output implies that a return to 
prerecession production is not synonymous with an elimination of economic slack. What is 
striking in this column is how varied was the experience and how long was the typical path to 
recovery. 
In the event, abandoning the gold standard was not a foolproof solution for economic 
recovery. Figure 2 plots for each country in table 2 the peak-to-trough decline in real GDP 
against the number of years it took after 1929 for the country to devalue or leave the gold 
standard. There is no obvious association between the timing of devaluation and the severity of 
the downturn. Early leavers (those in 1929 and 1930) experienced output contractions ranging 
from 13 to 36 percent. Late exiters (from 1933 onward) suffered output declines from 6 to 32 
percent.   
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Table 2.  Depth and Duration of the Great Depression by Year of Exit from the Gold Standard 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Year of business 
cycle peak 
Peak-to-trough 
decline in real 
GDP per capitaa 
(percent) 
Years until 
return to 
precrisis real 
GDP 
December 1929 and 1930 exits from gold standard 
Australia 1926 17.3 10 
New Zealand 1929 17.8 7 
Argentina 1929 19.4 15 
Brazil 1928 13.3 8 
Uruguay 1929 36.1 17 
Venezuela 1929 24.1 6 
1931 exits from gold standard 
United Kingdom 1929 6.6 5 
Austria 1929 23.4 10 
Canada 1928 29.0 12 
Finland 1929 6.1 5 
Germany 1928 17.8 7 
Japan 1929 9.3 4 
Norway 1929 1.9 3 
Sweden 1930 4.8 4 
Chile 1929 46.6 16 
El Salvador 1928 11.3 9 
Hungary 1929 11.4 7 
India 1929 8.2 31 
Korea 1928 12.7 5 
Malayab 1929 17 35 
Mexico 1929 31.1 16 
Portugal 1929 2.4 2 
1932 exits from gold standard 
Colombia 1929 3.8 3 
Costa Rica 1928 15.7 9 
Greece 1930 6.4 4 
Nicaragua 1929 43.0 24 
Peru 1929 25.4 6 
Romania 1931 8.0 7 
1933 exits from gold standard 
United States 1929 28.9 10 
Guatemala 1930 23.6 6 
Honduras 1931 32.0 36 
Philippines 1929 13.1 8 
1934 exits from gold standard 
Italy 1929 6.4 6 
1935 exits from gold standard 
Belgium 1928 10.4 11 
1936 exits from gold standard 
France 1929 15.9 10 
Netherlands 1929 16.0 21 
Switzerland 1929 9.8 9 
Netherlands East Indiesb 1929 14.3 9 
Poland 1929 24.9 9 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Eichengreen (1992); League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Officer (2001); Maddison (2004); Mitchell (2003 a, b, and c).    
a. GDP is measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, see Maddison (2004). 
b. Present-day Malaysia and Singapore.  
c. Present-day Indonesia. 
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In his work with different coauthors on the interwar gold standard, Barry Eichengreen 
has argued that devaluation against gold was an engine of reflation.13 The simple scatterplot in 
figure 2 suggests that those benefits were not always evident. But the figure implicitly differs 
from the prior literature in three ways: the choice of the measure of activity, the window of 
observation, and the country coverage; these differences can be addressed systematically. 
Table 3 reports regressions that seek to explain various measures of economic recovery 
in the 1930s for different sets of countries. The first column reproduces what might be called 
“exhibit A” for those arguing that the change in the exchange rate regime was crucial in 
fostering economic recovery. That column, following the literature, relies on information 
collected in real time by the League of Nations. The change in industrial production from 1929 
                                                 
13
 See Eichengreen (1992), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), and Eichengreen and Temin (2000). 
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to 1937 for the 14 countries for which data are available from that source is regressed against 
the number of years after 1929 that the country exited the gold standard. For these 14 countries, 
leaving the gold standard had a statistically significant effect on industrial production over that 
common time period. Indeed, the coefficient on the timing variable is quite large. Leaving the 
gold standard at the start rather than at the end of the period prevented a decline in industrial 
output of more than one-half.  
It might be argued that the more pronounced effect on industrial production in part 
reflects the higher cyclical amplitude of this narrower slice of economic activity. It could also 
be due to the greater dependence of manufacturing on international trade. The second column 
therefore repeats the exercise for the same countries but uses the change in real GDP per capita 
in place of the change in industrial production. The results, although smaller, remain significant 
and quantitatively important for this broader measure of activity. According to this estimate, 
delaying the exit from the beginning to the end of this fixed window is associated with about a 
20 percent loss in real GDP per capita.  
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Table 3. Regressions Explaining the Depth and Duration of the Great Depression by Date of Exit 
from the Gold Standarda 
 Dependent variable: Change in industrial 
production or real GDP per capita, 1929-37 
(percent) 
 
 
 
Independent variable 
 
Industrial 
productionb  
 
Real GDP 
per capitab  
 
Real GDP 
per capita  
Dependent variable:  
Peak-to-trough 
decline in real GDP 
[p.cap?] (percent) 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Years until return to 
precrisis level 
(percent) 
Constant 50.521 20.014 9.066 18.105 7.865  10.176 5.848 
 (9.196) (3.523) (4.763) (3.367) (4.521)  (2.567) (3.923) 
-8.051 -3.731 -1.959 -0.346 1.019  0.213 0.836 Exit from gold standard (years after 
1929) (2.247) (0.861) (1.338) (0.946) (0.954)  (0.721) (0.828) 
    3.558   -1.473 Dummy for Axis power 
    (5.489)   (4.763) 
    14.815   5.313 Dummy for Latin America 
    (3.918)   (3.400?) 
    6.285   5.770? Dummy for British Commonwealth  
    (5.427)   (4.709) 
         
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.573 0.055 -0.023 0.228  -0.025 -0.002 
Standard error of the regression 19.065 7.305 15.662 11.072 9.619  8.44 8.346 
 
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; Eichengreen 
(1992); Officer (2001); Maddison (2004); Mitchell (2001[2003a b c?]). 
a. Sample consists of 37 countries except where noted otherwise. 
b. Sample consists of 14 countries. 
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The previous literature’s use of the League of Nations sample puts particular weight on 
the experience of large countries and of countries in Europe. The third column therefore 
broadens the sample to include 37 countries, including many in Latin America. Although the 
coefficient on the timing variable remains negative, it is no longer statistically significant. Thus, 
some of the purported benefits of the 1930s regime switch are apparently sensitive to the 
country set. 
In addition, because countries left the gold standard at different times, the literature’s use 
of a single time period to measure recovery across that experience might be inappropriate. An 
alternative is to determine the width of the observation window country by country. We ran 
regressions using the date of exit from the gold standard to explain, first, the peak-to-trough 
decline in real GDP (fifth and sixth columns in table 3), and second, the number of years it took 
for real GDP to return to its pre-crisis level (final two columns). Because of the varied country 
set, the table reports both the simple regression using the date of exit and an augmented one that 
also includes dummy variables for whether the country was an Axis power, in Latin America, or 
a member of the British Commonwealth. In no case does the date of exit from the gold standard 
help to explain the depth or duration of the downturn, confirming the message from the earlier 
scatterplot. 
All told, the evidence that countries exiting the gold standard early fared better is 
apparently fragile. Indeed, once one expands the sample to a broader set of countries and 
considers other measures of the business cycle, leaving the gold standard early was not always a 
reliable route to a shorter or less severe recession.  
Why did exiting the gold standard generate so little benefit in the larger sample? The 
answer in part was already evident in table 2. Countries left the gold standard at different times. 
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Moreover, when they did leave, the range of variation in bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar was wide, indicating that policymakers did not follow a common roadmap. The 
greatest number of countries left in 1931, but those that did so in 1932 adjusted by more. A few 
that moved to some form of floating arrangement saw their currencies unhelpfully appreciate 
against the dollar.  
The important point for the United States is that almost all of these devaluations relative 
to gold produced an appreciation relative to the dollar, which added to the force of contraction 
domestically. Not until 1933 was some of that force pushed back, and even then the dollar still 
appreciated against the currencies of many economies. For contemporaneous observers, these 
swings in bilateral exchange rates smacked of “beggar thy neighbor” policy. From that 
experience was born a mistrust of floating exchange rates and a desire for a more managed 
system (famously expressed by Ragnar Nurkse 1944, among others). The net effect of these 
currency changes was to worsen the external drag on the U.S. economy, exactly when the 
appropriate policy was to reflate.  
Some sense of the net external drag can be gotten from figure 3, which plots effective 
exchange rate indices between the United States and five country groups. The base is set to 100 
in 1929, and the shaded area represents the range from plus to minus 15 percent of that parity. 
There are three main messages. First, the shaded area encompasses the experience from 1933 
and thereafter, suggesting that external relative price adjustment was not the crucial means of 
rebalancing. Second, Canada’s vaunted embrace of floating exchange rates produced a result 
suggestive of considerable management in that market outcome.14 Third, most of the lines 
                                                 
14
 Indeed, “fear of floating” in the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) sense seems evident. 
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follow a track above 100 (that is, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar), implying that exchange 
rates worked to offset some of the domestic U.S. monetary policy stimulus. 
 18 
 
This brings to mind Robert Mundell’s (1968) insights about the N + 1 currency problem. 
In a system of N + 1 floating exchange rates, depreciation of the N currencies must come from 
an appreciation of the N + 1 currency. This creates a need for the economy using that anchor 
currency to overcompensate with domestic stimulus for that force of external restraint. The 
advantage of the gold standard was that all N could cheapen their currencies without putting a 
special burden on any one nation, given that the N + 1 price was the value of gold. In the event, 
however, the adjustment was not so smooth.  
 
III. Fiscal Policy during the Great Depression 
Sustained fiscal impetus in the major countries was similarly needed in the 1930s. And it was 
tried in many countries, but seldom consistently. Indeed, in many cases fiscal policy contracted 
as the national economy shrank, worsening the downturn. This record of policymaking is 
summarized in table 4, which reports for a group of 30 countries the year in which economic 
activity hit its cyclical low, as well as real government spending in that year, indexed so that the 
1929 level equals 100.15 We rely on government spending to measure the fiscal impetus, rather 
than the more commonly used budget balance, for two reasons. First, revenue typically falls off 
in economic contractions, irrespective of policy intent, thus worsening the fiscal balance without 
necessarily providing much impetus. Second, we are somewhat more confident about the 
                                                 
15
 Because of data limitations inherent in a large historical sample, the table uses statistics on central government 
spending only, which is problematic for countries with a federal system that allows discretion at the state or province 
level, such as the United States and Argentina, among others. Local budgetary pressures may have necessitated 
spending retrenchment that offset any federal impetus. 
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reliability of spending data over time and across countries than about that of revenue (see 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 2005).  
The countries in table 4 are listed according to the co-movement of government spending 
and the economic cycle, from the most procyclical to the most countercyclical. Quite clearly, 
fiscal policy sometimes imparted considerable restraint rather than stimulus. As the third column 
shows, real government spending contracted in at least one year in 24 of the 30 countries, 
sometimes by a large amount. 
The United States was not among the countries where the trend of real government 
spending amplified the business cycle: by the trough in 1933, real government spending was 
almost twice its level of 1929. Figure 4 plots real government spending in the United States and 
Canada, again indexed to 100 in 1929. There were three distinct episodes of large increases in 
spending, first at the end of President Herbert Hoover’s administration in 1932 and then under 
Roosevelt in 1934 and 1936. Contrary to the popular perception, Hoover did significantly 
enlarge the role of government.16 In contrast, the governments of the United Kingdom and the 
Nordic countries provided less impetus, and fiscal policy in the Latin American countries was 
decidedly procyclical until 1934. The last group was no doubt hampered by a lack of access to 
funding, as well as institutional problems evident, among others, in Argentina and Brazil. 
                                                 
16
 Akerlof and Shiller (2009) applaud the aggressiveness of both Hoover and Roosevelt but lament the unevenness 
of their policies. 
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Table 4. Real Government Spending in Selected Countries,  1929-36a 
 
 
 
Country 
Year of trough in 
real GDP per 
capita  
Real government 
spending at trough 
(1929 = 100) 
Largest annual 
decline in real 
spending (percent) 
Year  of largest 
decline in real 
spending 
Chile 1932 53.0 34.4 1932 
Peru 1932 55.7 25.7 1932 
Venezuela 1932 73.8 33.2 1931 
Finland 1932 79.4 28.7 1932 
Austria 1933 79.9 21.8 1933 
Germany 1932 94.1 9.8 1931 
Netherlands East Indies 1934 94.9 4.0 1931 
Brazil 1931 96.4 15.4 1931 
Mexico 1932 96.9 7.2 1931 
Japan 1931 99.7 8.9 1931 
Colombia 1931 102.0 32.7 1929 
Norway 1931 105.5 None NA 
New Zealand 1932 106.1 3.7 1932 
Argentina 1932 110.2 3.9 1931 
Uruguay 1933 110.7 13.3 1929 
Hungary  1932 111.8 10.2 1932 
India 1938 112.6 9.9 1932 
Poland 1933 114.0 None NA 
Australia 1931 115.7 3.1 1929 
Belgium 1932 116.2 0.2 1932 
Greece 1932 117.5 38.8 1931 
United Kingdom 1931 118.3 None NA 
Korea 1932 120.2 None NA 
France 1932 138.9 None NA 
Canada 1933 149.0 11.9 1933 
Portugal 1936 151.9 3.9 1930 
Sweden 1933 152.3 None NA 
Netherlands 1934 154.2 3.6 1934 
Italy 1934 178.5 31.1 1929 
United States 1933 191.6 2.1 1933 
     
Median  111.3   
Standard deviation  31.9   
 
Sources: Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein; and authors’ 
calculations. 
a. Central government only. 
Although fiscal impetus was forceful in some countries, in almost all it was also erratic. 
Figure 4 further reveals that each of the three large increases in spending in the United States and 
Canada was followed by some retrenchment. The impetus from government spending in the 
United States in 1932, 1934, and 1936 appeared on track to provide considerable lift to the 
economy, but after each of those years real spending dropped off, imparting an arithmetic drag 
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on expansion. The fact that fiscal expansion has been aggressive in many countries in 2009 
works to help contain the contraction in the global economy. That such policy will continue to do 
so is far from assured, if history is any guide. 
 
Table 5 examines the ebbs and flows of real government spending across countries from 
1929 to 1939. The first column reports the most conventional measure of spending volatility, the 
standard deviation of annual percentage changes in spending. Fiscal policy was indeed volatile in 
this period, with six countries posting a standard deviation of spending of more than 30 percent. 
A second indicator of the inconsistency of fiscal policy is the frequency with which government 
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spending sharply reverses course. We calculate the “amplitude” of such a reversal as the sum of 
the percentage changes in spending in two consecutive years in which the first year sees a rise in 
spending and the second a decline. The second column of table 5 reports the amplitude of the 
largest such reversal in real spending growth for each country, the third lists the year of that 
reversal, and the fourth reports the number of times such reversals exceeded 10 percentage points 
in amplitude. Again and again, fiscal policy lacked follow-through in providing consistent 
impetus. Every one of the 29 countries in the table experienced a reversal of real spending in at 
least one year of the decade, and all but one country suffered at least one reversal with an 
amplitude of more than 10 percentage points. 
This volatility of fiscal spending could, in principle, have blunted some of the force of the 
fiscal impetus if it made rendered economic planning more difficult.  Table 6 examines the 
extent to which such a mechanism was at work: using data from a sample of 30 countries from 
1929 to 1939, the table reports regressions that attempt to explain the variation in the depth and 
duration of the business cycle with a measure of the growth of real government spending 
standardized by its volatility; to be precise, it is the average annual change in real government 
spending from 1929 to 1939, divided by its standard deviation. These regressions were 
performed with and without dummy variables for regions and for whether the country was an 
Axis power; the regressions including the dummy variables also include the logarithms of real 
GDP per capita and population in 1928, to capture any effects of country size. 
As is evident from the first pair of regressions, the depth of the cycle appears unrelated to 
the volatility of government spending. However, the remaining regressions at least produce 
coefficients that match the intuition. Higher standardized spending hastened the return of output 
to pre-crisis levels and added to real GDP growth. However, the standard deviation of spending 
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is in the denominator of that explanatory variable, implying that greater volatility of real 
government spending tended to delay economic recovery and to reduce the net change in real 
GDP per capita. Thus, there may have been real costs associated with policy wavering. 
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Table 5.  
Volatility of and Reversals in Real Government Spending in Selected Countries, 1929-1939 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Standard deviation of 
annual changes in real 
government spending 
(percent) 
 
Amplitude of largest 
fiscal reversala 
 (percentage points) 
 
 
Year of largest 
reversal  
No. of   
reversals with 
amplitude > 10 
percentage points 
Italy 105.4 227.7 1937 3 
Greece 61.3 159.2 1931 3 
Peru 45.0 64.8 1929 5 
United States 33.8 47.5 1933,  1935b  3 
Brazil 31.5 55.0 1933 5 
Finland 30.6 33.0 1929 4 
Portugal 29.7 66.6 1937 2 
Japan 28.9 42.3 1937 4 
Chile 27.6 51.5 1929 4 
Colombia 27.6 68.0 1929 3 
Venezuela 24.7 46.8 1929 4 
France 21.5 15.1 1936 2 
Germany 21.2 21.5 1929 2 
Canada 16.6 39.9 1933 2 
Sweden 16.5 31.4 1934 2 
Austria 16.4 18.5 1931, 1932b  3 
Uruguay 16.4 24.1 1929 2 
Argentina 15.2 21.2 1935 3 
Netherlands 12.5 20.7 1932 3 
Mexico 12.0 24.4 1937 1 
Korea 11.9 16.6 1932 3 
Netherlands East Indies 11.7 30.3 1938 1 
India 10.0 13.5 1931 2 
Hungary  9.6 20.1 1932 1 
United Kingdom 9.0 12.8 1933 1 
Norway 8.6 11.9 1933 1 
Poland 7.8 12.8 1937 1 
Australia 7.2 11.8 1932 1 
New Zealand 6.5 8.9 1932 0 
 
Sources: Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein; authors’ 
calculations. 
a. A reversal is defined as a year of rising followed by a year of declining government spending; the amplitude of a 
reversal is calculated as growth in year t plus growth in year t + 1.  For instance, if real spending rose by 15 percent 
in year t and declined by 12 percent in the following year, the amplitude would be 27 percentage points.  
b. Reversals in the two years were comparable in amplitude 
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Table 6.       
Real government spending and the shape of economic 
recovery 
   
1929 to 1939, across 30 countries       
       
       
 Dependent variable: Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
Independent Peak-to-trough decline Years until return to Change in real GDP per 
variables: in real GDP (percent) 
pre-crisis level, 
number 
capita, 1929 to 1937 
(percent) 
       
Constant 14.22 25.15 10.51 9.88 -2.30 -7.51 
 11.42 11.26 6.56 7.15 14.05 15.83 
       
Average growth of real 
government 1.49 -9.50 -0.83 -1.58 5.63 11.86 
spending divided by standard 7.71 7.90 4.42 5.01 9.48 11.11 
deviation of that growth (a)       
       
Dummies for:       
       
Axis power?  3.38  -0.75  -4.71 
  5.70  3.62  8.02 
       
Latin American?  15.54  3.61  -9.65 
  4.91  3.11  6.90 
       
Commonwealth?  3.05  5.19  -4.13 
  5.21  3.30  7.32 
        
       
Adjusted R² 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.09 
       
Standard error of 11.04 9.83 6.33 6.24 13.57 13.82 
the regression       
Note:  Standard errors are given in italics.       
       
(a)  Sample from 1929 to 1939       
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IV. Some Lessons 
 
Unconventional monetary policy and aggressive fiscal policy were used extensively in 
the 1930s, in a considerable number of countries. They were not, however, employed 
consistently. Monetary policy was hampered by beggar-thy-neighbor problems as countries 
devalued relative to gold at different times and by different amounts. As a consequence, 
countries derived less benefit from exiting the gold standard than they could have, if indeed they 
saw any benefit at all. The United States was in the vanguard of aggressive use of fiscal policy at 
the central government level, but there and in many other countries this fiscal impetus was partly 
reversed soon after. The net effect was to raise volatility—and therefore uncertainty—and 
potentially to lessen the stimulus provided. 
A message from the 1930s is that national authorities must recognize that the openness of 
the global economy sometimes works to blunt the effectiveness of policy in one country. In the 
2000s the N + 1 currency has been the U.S. dollar, whose special reserve-currency status meant 
that the United States received flight-to-safety flows even as it was the epicenter of the financial 
crisis.17 Like the appreciating U.S. dollar in the first part of the 1930s, this flight to the safe 
haven by capital holders outside the United States, by bolstering the dollar, augments the forces 
of restraint at home. 
Such a force may strengthen the case for concerted fiscal stimulus, but here an unpleasant 
reality intrudes: financial markets do not view all countries alike. Some have a history of 
uncertain repayment of their debt. Indeed, as shown by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Miguel Savastano 
                                                 
17
 We raised this point in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) when we asked whether the United States was too big to fail. 
Note the parallel with the discussion of the Federal Reserve’s failure in the early 1930s. Policymakers need to 
recognize that safe-haven flows increase demand, necessitating even greater increases in supply. 
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(2003), some countries are “debt intolerant” and tend to default at debt-to-income ratios that 
elsewhere would be an entry ticket to European Monetary Union under the Maastricht Treaty. 
Progress in institution building has been significant in many of these emerging market 
economies. But national authorities take that lingering lack of acceptance very seriously and are 
unlikely to act in a fashion that threatens a reminder of earlier excesses. This implies that the 
advanced economies may be the only agents with significant scope for fiscal stimulus during a 
global crisis.18 
                                                 
18
 Another reason the advanced economies may have to shoulder more of the burden is systematic differences in 
fiscal multipliers across the North and the South, as discussed in Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2009). 
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Appendix Table 1        
Properties of the Data Set 
     
        
Country  
Exit from the Gold 
Standard  Country attributes   
   Years    British 
   until exit  Axis Latin Commonwealth 
  Year after 1929  country? American? member? 
Argentina  1930 1  0 1 0 
Australia  1930 1  0 0 1 
Austria  1931 2  1 0 0 
Belgium  1935 6  0 0 0 
Brazil  1930 1  0 1 0 
Canada  1931 2  0 0 1 
Chile  1931 2  0 1 0 
Colombia  1932 3  0 1 0 
Costa Rica  1932 3  0 1 0 
El Salvador  1931 2  0 1 0 
Finland  1931 2  0 0 0 
France  1936 7  0 0 0 
Germany  1931 2  1 0 0 
Greece  1932 3  0 0 0 
Guatemala  1933 4  0 1 0 
Honduras  1933 4  0 1 0 
Hungary  1931 2  0 0 0 
India  1931 2  0 0 1 
Indonesia  1936 7  0 0 0 
Italy  1934 5  1 0 0 
Japan  1931 2  1 0 0 
Korea  1931 2  0 0 0 
Malaysia (Malaya)  1931 2  0 0 0 
Mexico  1931 2  0 1 0 
Netherlands  1936 7  0 0 0 
New Zealand  1930 1  0 0 1 
Nicaragua  1932 3  0 1 0 
Norway  1931 2  0 0 0 
Peru  1932 3  0 1 0 
Philippines  1933 4  0 0 0 
Poland  1936 7  0 0 0 
Portugal  1931 2  0 0 0 
Romania  1932 3  0 0 0 
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Sweden  1931 2  0 0 0 
Switzerland  1936 7  0 0 0 
UK  1931 2  0 0 1 
US  1933 4  0 0 0 
Uruguay  1930 1  0 1 0 
Venezuela  1930 1  0 1 0 
        
Sources:        
1. Eichengreen, Barry, 1992. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 
2. Maddison, Angus, 2004. Historical Statistics for the World Economy, 1-2003 AD  
3a. Mitchell, Brian R. 2003a. International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia, Oceania, 1750-2000 
3b. Mitchell, Brian R. 2003b. International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750-2000  
3c. Mitchell, Brian R. 2003c. International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-2000  
4. Officer, Lawrence H. 2001. "Gold Standard."     
5. League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook (various).     
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Appendix Table 2        
Economic performance, 1929 to 1937 
    
       Change in 
Country  Change in real GDP per capita,  industrial 
  percent        production 
  
1929 
to peak-to-  Years to  1929 to 
  1937 trough decline  recover  1937 
Argentina  -5.5 19.4  15  . 
Australia  9.2 17.3  10  . 
Austria  -14.7 23.4  10  3 
Belgium  -1.8 10.4  11  -3.7 
Brazil  9.9 13.3  8  . 
Canada  -11.7 29  12  -0.5 
Chile  -7.9 46.6  16  31.6 
Colombia  16.4 3.8  3  . 
Costa Rica  13.9 15.7  9  . 
El Salvador  2.3 11.3  9  . 
Finland  26.7 6.1  5  55.6 
France  -4.7 15.9  10  -18.3 
Germany  15.6 17.8  7  17.2 
Greece  18.2 6.4  4  51.2 
Guatemala  28.2 23.6  6  . 
Honduras  -29.1 32  36  . 
Hungary  2.7 11.4  7  21.5 
India  -7.1 8.2  31  . 
Indonesia  -2.5 14.3  9  . 
Italy  7.3 6.4  6  . 
Japan  14.3 9.3  4  70.8 
Korea  39.7 12.7  5  . 
Malaysia (Malaya)  -22.2 17  35  . 
Mexico  2.2 31.1  16  24 
Netherlands  -4.5 16  21  2.8 
New Zealand  15.9 17.8  7  . 
Nicaragua  -39.8 43  24  . 
Norway  23.8 1.9  3  29.6 
Peru  1 25.4  6  . 
Philippines  1.1 13.1  8  . 
Poland  -9.5 24.9  9  8.6 
Portugal  9.1 2.4  2  . 
Romania  -1.9 8  7  31.7 
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Sweden  25.3 4.8  4  49 
Switzerland  -2.5 9.8  9  . 
UK  13 6.6  5  23.6 
US  -6.8 28.9  10  -7.8 
Uruguay  -10 36.1  17  . 
Venezuela  13.7 24.1  6  . 
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Appendix Table 3         
Real government spending, 1929 to 1937 
   
  
      
   
Country  Real government spending,     
   Annual change  
Normalized by standard 
deviation 
  Maximum  Standard  Maximum   
  impetus Mean deviation  impetus Mean  
Argentina  132.61 15.17 8.47  15.66 1.79  
Australia  115.68 7.16 4.95  23.35 1.45  
Austria  122.56 16.44 12.47  9.83 1.32  
Belgium  135.22 6.99 5.71  23.67 1.22  
Brazil  139.77 31.54 16.83  8.31 1.87  
Canada  169.10 16.56 11.70  14.46 1.42  
Chile  109.89 27.57 18.25  6.02 1.51  
Colombia  112.37 27.58 14.32  7.85 1.93  
Costa Rica  . . .  . .  
El Salvador  . . .  . .  
Finland  153.24 30.56 21.15  7.24 1.44  
France  148.29 21.47 19.25  7.70 1.12  
Germany  125.40 19.20 14.36  8.73 1.34  
Greece  220.46 61.30 41.60  5.30 1.47  
Guatemala  . . .  . .  
Honduras  . . .  . .  
Hungary  124.46 9.61 10.69  11.65 0.90  
India  119.65 10.03 6.79  17.62 1.48  
Indonesia  126.97 11.72 10.13  12.53 1.16  
Italy  372.00 105.38 63.12  5.89 1.67  
Japan  237.27 28.94 17.07  13.90 1.70  
Korea  191.15 11.89 7.00  27.31 1.70  
Malaysia (Malaya)  . . .  . .  
Mexico  144.38 11.96 9.27  15.58 1.29  
Netherlands  166.13 12.46 8.71  19.07 1.43  
New Zealand  151.39 6.45 5.60  27.05 1.15  
Nicaragua  . . .  . .  
Norway  109.04 8.58 8.52  12.80 1.01  
Peru  101.50 45.03 26.13  3.88 1.72  
Philippines  . . .  . .  
Poland  136.61 8.25 5.50  24.83 1.50  
Portugal  151.87 29.68 17.86  8.50 1.66  
Romania  . . .  . .  
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Sweden  159.25 16.54 9.25  17.22 1.79  
Switzerland  . . .  . .  
UK  124.93 8.96 8.59  14.54 1.04  
US  330.89 33.80 20.40  16.22 1.66  
Uruguay  152.64 16.43 10.40  14.68 1.58  
Venezuela  165.99 24.68 16.92  9.81 1.46  
 
